

Message Text

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8346

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 BUDAPEST 1303

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: AMGT, HU, US, PFOR, XH

SUBJECT: ANNUAL POLICY ASSESSMENT - PART I

REF: (A) STATE 038338, (B) STATE 038356, (C) STATE 041169

1. U.S. INTERESTS IN HUNGARY: HUNGARY IS A SMALL STATE WITH LIMITED RESOURCES. OUR DIRECT BILATERAL ECONOMIC, COMMERCIAL, AND CONSULAR INTERESTS HERE ARE MODEST. HOWEVER, I BELIEVE HUNGARY IS IMPORTANT TO U.S. IN CONTEXT OF U.S. RELATIONS WITH COUNTRIES OF WARSAW PACT. INTERPLAY OF INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN AND AMONG EUROPEAN COMMUNIST STATES IS OBVIOUSLY IMPORTANT FACTOR IN LONG-TERM EVOLUTION OF COMMUNIST WORLD AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH U.S. HUNGARY'S DIFFERENT ECONOMIC SYSTEM (NEM), POLITICAL TACTICS IT USES TO SECURE ACCEPTANCE OF ITS POLICIES, AND ITS MODERATE APPROACH TO CSCE ISSUES ARE FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO IMPROVEMENT OF LOT OF HUNGARIAN PEOPLE; THEY ALSO HAVE AN IMPACT ON OTHER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES AS WELL. WE HAVE AN INTEREST IN SEEING HUNGARY DEVELOPING INTO A MORE INDEPENDENT ENTITY, MORE RESPONSIVE THAN EVER TO WELL-BEING AND LEGITIMATE SELF-INTEREST OF ITS PEOPLE. HUNGARY IS LOCATED STRATEGICALLY IN CENTER OF BUFFER STATES BORDERING USSR. SOVIET FORCES STATIONED HERE, ALTHOUGH PRESENTLY OUTSIDE SCOPE OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, CONFIDENTIAL

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ARE STRATEGICALLY RELATED TO MILITARY BALANCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE. ALONG WITH HUNGARIAN FORCES THEY POSE COUNTER-WEIGHT TO WESTERN FORCES IN ITALY AND, UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, A POTENTIAL THREAT TO YUGOSLAVIA AND ROMANIA. HUNGARY HAS TAKEN AN ADVANCED POSITION WITHIN THE WARSAW PACT ON CSCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS A
YHAS BEEN

VSZING ACTIVELY TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH U.S. BECAUSE OF FORMER IT HAS BEEN SUBJECT TO CRITICISM FROM ITS ALLIES. AS S/P FORECAST STRESSES (PARAS 6 AND 9, REFTEL A), IT IS IN U.S. INTEREST TO ENCOURAGE CONTINUATION OF THESE POLICIES. FEW WOULD ARGUE AGAINST VIEW THAT IT IS IN U.S. INTERESTS TO NURTURE HUNGARIAN AWARENESS OF AND PRIDE IN ITS WESTERN CULTURAL HERITAGE AND TO EXPAND COOPERATION WITH WEST SO THAT HUMANISM, LIBERAL IDEAS, AND PLURALISTIC IDEALS CONTINUE TO PERMEATE HUNGARIAN SOCIETY TO DETRIMENT OF MOSCOW INFLUENCE. I BELIEVE THAT, TO EXTENT THAT HUNGARY DEVELOPS A PROFITABLE RELATIONS WITH U.S., ITS UNQUESTIONING RESPONSIVENESS AS A SOVIET ALLY WILL BE PROPORTIONATELY REDUCED. I ESTIMATE THAT, BARRING A SHARP TURN DOWN IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, HUNGARY WILL CONTINUE TO PURSUE RELATIVELY LIBERAL POLICIES OVER NEXT FEW YEARS AS IT HAS SINCE 1975.

2. OVERVIEW: OVER PAST TWO YEARS HUNGARY HAS SHOWN A NOTICEABLE INTEREST IN IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH U.S. BILATERAL RELATIONS HAVE PROGRESSED AT A STEADY RATE, REFLECTING PACE AND LEVEL THAT HUNGARY IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT IN ITS SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH USSR. IMPROVEMENT IN OUR RELATIONS HAS BEEN MARKED BY SIGNING OF A CULTURAL/SCIENTIFIC AGREEMENT, EXPANSION OF USIA ACTIVITIES, SETTLEMENT OF ALL OUTSTANDING FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS TO U.S. (INCLUDING PAYMENT BY GOH OF WORLD WAR I FLOUR DEBT AND AGREEMENT ON SETTLING BLOCKED FORINTS ACCOUNT PROBLEM), A SERIES OF HIGH-LEVEL VISITS

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BY LEADERS OF TWO COUNTRIES, PROGRESS ON A NUMBER OF DIVIDED FAMILY CASES, A CONSTRUCTIVE BILATERAL APPROACH ON CSCE, AN AGREEMENT ON RECIPROCAL VISA FACILITATION FOR DIPLOMATS AND OFFICIALS, REMOVAL OF ALL INTERNAL TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS ON OFFICIAL AMERICANS, AND IMPROVING EMBASSY CONTACTS WITH HUNGARIAN COUNTERPARTS. GOH STRENGTHENED ITS POSITION IN PAST YEAR BY IMPROVING SOMEWHAT ITS BALANCE OF TRADE, ADROITLY CARRYING OFF PRICE RISES ON MEAT AND OTHER CONSUMER ITEMS, AND BY TACTFULLY IGNORING LETTER OF SUPPORT SENT BY 34 HUNGARIANS TO CHARTER 77 SIGNERS. DROPPING HARD-LINER AND PRO-SOVIET ARPAD PULLAI FROM HSWP SECRETARIAT DURING YEAR ALSO STRENGTHENED KADAR'S HAND AND WAS LARGE STEP TOWARDS ENSURING THAT HIS SUCCESSOR IS LIKELY TO BE SOMEONE OF KADAR'S STRIKE. DESPITE THIS SIGNIFICANT FORWARD MOVEMENT U.S.-HUNGARIAN RELATIONS IN THE FUTURE WILL BE CONDITIONED BY THE FOLLOWING FACTORS, MOST OF THEM OUTSIDE REALM OF BILATERAL RELATIONS.

(A) U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS: U.S. RELATIONS WITH

HUNGARY ARE DEPENDENT ON THE STATE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON. IF, FOR WHATEVER REASON (E.G. DEMISE OF BREZHNEV, RETURN TO COLD WAR, ETC.), U.S. RELATIONS WITH SOVIET UNION DEGENERATE, U.S. RELATIONS WITH HUNGARY WOULD ALSO SUFFER, AS TESTIFIED TO BY CURRENT MINOR DAMPENING DURING HUMAN RIGHTS DEBATE AND IN AFTERMATH OF SECRETARY'S VISIT TO MOSCOW.

(B) HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE: HUNGARY HAS NO DISSIDENT PROBLEM EVEN REMOTELY SIMILAR TO THAT AFFLICTING OTHER EE COUNTRIES. THIS DERIVES AS MUCH FROM GENERAL SUPPORT BY INTELLECTUALS OF KADAR'S POLICIES AS IT DOES FROM HUNGARIAN PENCHANT FOR DISTINGUISHING THEMSELVES WHEREVER POSSIBLE FROM THEIR WP ALLIES. KADAR'IO DECISION NOT TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST A GROUP OF 34 INTELLECTUALS WHO SIGNED A PETITION IN SUPPORT OF CHARTER 77, HOWEVER, SEEMS TO HAVE CAUSED SOME STRAIN WITH HIS ALLIES. AT RECENT SOFIA CONDERENCE OF CP
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SECRETARIES HUNGARY WAS APPARENTLY CRITICIZED BY SEVERAL PARTIES FOR ITS TOLERANT ATTITUDE TOWARDS DISSENT. HUNGARIANS ARE WARY OF HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE. THEY FEAR THAT U.S. MAY PUSH ISSUE WITH USSR TO PIINT OF HARDENING SOVIET RELATIONS WITH U.S. REACTION IN HUNGARY TO SUCH AN EVENTUALITY WOULD BE TO DETRIMENT OF HUNGARY'S RELATIONS WITH U.S. WHICH BUDAPEST HAS SO ASSIDUOUSLY CULTIVATED FOR PAST TWO YEARS.

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CORRECTED COPY-TEXT (THROUGHOUT)

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(C) IMPLICATIONS OF DEVELOPMENTS ELSEWHERE IN EASTERN EUROPE: A SOVIET DECISION TO USE FORCE IN POST-TITO PERIOD TO RESTORE MOSCOW HEGEMONY OVER YUGOSLAVIA COULD NOT FAIL TO HAVE AN IMPACT IN HUNGARY HARMFUL TO U.S.-HUNGARIAN RELATIONS. THIS WOULD BE TRUE PARTICULARLY IF, AS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN 1968, HUNGARIAN TROOPS IN TOKEN OR IN OTHER FORM WERE ASKED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PACIFICATION OF YUGOSLAVIA. EVEN IF ONLY SOVIET TROOPS NOW STATIONED IN HUNGARY WERE USED IN SUCH AN ADVENTURE IN YUGOSLAVIA, THE ATMOSPHERE IN EUROPE WOULD BE SO POISONED THAT A TURNDOWN IN U.S.-HUNGARIAN RELATIONS WOULD BE INEVITABLE.

U.S.-HUNGARIAN RELATIONS MIGHT ALSO BE AFFECTED BY DEVELOPMENTS IN OTHER EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. HUNGARIANS HAVE BEEN SERIOUSLY WORRIED OVER PAST MONTHS RE COURSE OF EVENTS, PARTICULARLY IN POLAND AND, TO LESSER EXTENT, IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. HUNGARIAN LEADERSHIP IS KEENLY AWARE THAT FOOD RIOTS OR OTHER WIDESPREAD DISORDERS IN POLAND, GIVEN HUNGARY'S POLISH CONNECTION (1848 AND 1956), COULD STIMULATE SIMILAR DISORDERS IN
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HUNGARY IF ECONOMIC SITUATION WERE TO DETERIORATE. CURRENT PLANS FOR CONSUMER INCOME GROWTH ARE RELATIVELY MODEST AND REASONABLE, BUT HIGHLY DEPENDENT ON FACTORS OUTSIDE GOH CONTROL. DETERIORATING ECONOMIC CONDITIONS MIGHT FORCE HUNGARY TO TRIM RADICALLY ITS RELATIVELY LIBERAL INTERNAL POLICIES. SIMILAR CONCERN RE DISSIDENCE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA IS PREVALENT, BUT I DOUBT TO SAME DEGREE AS CONCERN RE POLISH SITUATION.

(D) CHALLENGE TO SOVIET POSITION IN EE: IT HAS LONG BEEN RECOGNIZED AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF USG EE POLICY THAT IN CONTEXT OF GREADUALLY INCREASING INDEPENDENCE OF THESE STATES, U.S. POLICY MUST BE PARTICULARLY CIRCUMSPECT IN ORDER THAT MOSCOW'S LEADERSHIP DOES NOT BECOME SO ALARMED AS TO LEAD TO A DESTABILIZATION AS HAPPENED IN 1956. THUS, U.S. POLICY MUST BE CAUTIOUS AND CONDITIONED BY BUDAPEST'S OWN ESTIMATE OF THE OUTER LIMITES OF SOVIET TOLERANCE OF ITS ACTIVITIES.

3. ISSUES, OBJECTIVES AND COURSES OF ACTION: AS S/P SUGGESTS IN ITS TRENDS PAPER, I ASSUME THAT THERE WILL BE SUBSTANTIAL FORWARD MOMENTUM IN U.S. RELATIONS WITH

SOVIET UNION. IF THERE IS, WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF DEVELOPING OPPORTUNITIES TO RESOLVE OUR THREE MAIN PROBLEMS, ALL OF WHICH REQUIRE DEPARTMENT DECISION: (A) CROWN, (B) USG PROPERTY, AND (C) MFN. PROGRESS ON THESE ISSUES WOULD HAVE FAVORABLE IMPACT ON GENERAL COURSE OF U.S.-HUNGARIAN RELATIONS.

(A) CROWN: FOR OVER A YEAR NOW, HUNGARIANS HAVE MADE KNOWN THEIR GROWING EXPECTATION THAT CROWN WOULD SOON BE RETURNED, TEMPERING THEIR APPROACHES WITH TACIT UNDERSTANDING THAT 1976 WAS AN ELECTION YEAR. I BELIEVE THAT USG SHOULD MAKE A DECISION NOW TO RETURN THE CROWN TO HUNGARY AND THAT WE SHOULD CONVEY THIS DECISION TO HUNGARIANS IN CAREFULLY CONDITIONED LANGUAGE WHICH WOULD LEAVE US AN ESCAPE ROUTE IN EVENT OF BREAKDOWN IN EAST-WEST DETENTE OR SOME OTHER UNEXPECTED BUT EQUALLY CONFIDENTIAL

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UNTOWARD TENDENCY. RETENTION OF CROWN IS NOW MORE OF AN OBSTACLE THAN AN ASSET IN U.S.-GOS RELATIONS AND THREATENS TO RETARD THEIR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT.

(B) PROPERTY: ALTHOUGH GOS HAS INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO UNDERTAKE SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS TO RESOLVE PROPERTY PROBLEM, USG HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO MOVE FORWARD WITH NEGOTIATION PROPOSALS BECAUSE FBO FAILED TO RESPOND FAVORABLY TO REPEATED EMBASSY REQUESTS FOR AN ASSESSMENT OF PROPERTY'S VALUE. I BELIEVE IT IS ESSENTIAL TO DEVELOP A COORDINATED USG POSITION, ONE CLEARLY DESIGNED TO PRODUCE CONCRETE RESULTS AND BASED ON A PROFESSIONAL ESTIMATE OF PROPERTY VALUES AND MANY OPTIONS OPEN TO US FOR SETTLING OUR PRESENT AND FUTURE NEEDS. I AM CONVINCED THAT A FAVORABLE APPROACH ON CROWN, AS SUGGESTED ABOVE, WOULD PROVIDE A CLIMATE OF SUFFICIENT GOODWILL TO BRING ABOUT A RESOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM DURING PERIOD WHEN MODALITIES FOR RETURN OF CROWN ARE BEING DISCUSSED. BUT WE MUST MOVE NOW ON GETTING AN FBO PROPERTY ASSESSMENT TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF PRESENT CLIMATE.

(C) MFN: AMBIGUITY EXISTS AS TO WHETHER GOS CAN MEET OUR REQUIREMENT FOR ASSURANCES ABOUT LIBERAL EMIGRATION POLICIES. IN VERY NEAR FUTURE WE SHOULD ESTABLISH USG'S POSITION CONCERNING WHAT IT WANTS FROM GOS. WE SHOULD THEN MOVE AT A DELIBERATE PACE TO FERRET OUT GOS INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES. DEPENDING ON HOW SITUATION DEVELOPS, WE MAY NOT WISH TO ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE THIS QUESTION UNTIL ISSUES OF CROWN AND U.S.-OWNED PROPERTY IN BUDAPEST HAVE BEEN RESOLVED OR ARE WELL ON WAY TO RESOLUTION.

4. I STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH EACH COMMUNIST COUNTRY SHOULD BE LEFT TO FIND THEIR OWN LEVEL. ATTEMPTS TO ESTABLISH PRIORITIES BETWEEN COUN-

TRIES CAN ONLY HAVE A STULTIFYING EFFECT ON OUR RELATIONS
IN EASTERN EUROPE. DECISION SHOULD BE MADE ON BASIS OF
FACTS OBTAINING IN EACH COUNTRY, WITH DEPARTMENT INTER-
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JECTING DURING DECISION PROCESS ANY OVERRIDING FACTORS
WHICH MAY IN PARTICULAR INSTANCE CAUSE REGIONAL CON-
SIDERATIONS TO PREVAIL OVER BILATERAL ONES. SUCH A
POLICY SHOULD ALLOW USG TO ACHIEVE GREATEST PROGRESS
TRAFFIC WILL BEAR IN EACH COUNTRY. MOREOVER, DROPPING
PECKING ORDER WOULD NOT REQUIRE U.S. TO LEGITIMIZE
REPRESSIVE REGIMES, SINCE WE WOULD DECIDE IN "BILATERAL"
CONTEXT NOT TO CARRY OUT ANY MEASURES WHICH IN FACT HAVE
THAT EFFECT. IT IS BAD ENOUGH ALREADY THAT CONSIDERATION
OF SOVIET ATTITUDES ALREADY RESTRICTS OUR DECISION-MAKING
RE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. WE SHOULD NOT ADD TO OUR
TROUBLES.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 BUDAPEST 2303

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - T E X T (P A R A 5 . (B) (2))

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5. COURSES OF ACTION:

(A) POLITICAL:

(1) RETURN CROWN IN MANNER LIKELY TO FACILITATE
RESOLUTION OF FAMILY REUNIFICATION AND PROPERTY QUESTIONS
BUT WITHOUT DIRECT LINKAGE.

(2) ENCOURAGE HIGH-LEVEL EXCHANGES BETWEEN U.S.
AND HUNGARIAN OFFICIALS TO INCLUDE FOREIGN MINISTER PUJA
AND SECRETARY.

(3) MONITOR HUNGARIAN CSCE IMPLEMENTATION.

(4) FURTHER EXPLAND CONTACTS BETWEEN EMBASSY AND
HUNGARIAN ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING HSWP.

(B) MILITARY:

(1) ATTEMPT TO INDUCE HUNGARIAN ACCEPTANCE OF
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INVITATIONS TO FIELD GRADE OFFICERS TO VISIT ARMY UNITS
IN U.S. AND, IN RECIPROCAL FASHION, U.S. OFFICERS TO
VISIT HUNGARIAN UNITS.

(2) SOLICIT EARLIER ADVANCE NOTICE AND GREATER
DETAIL IN NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY MANEUVERS IN HUNGARY.
SEEK TO HAVE HUNGARIAN REPRESENTATIVES ATTEND WESTERN
MANEUVERS TO WHICH THEY ARE INVITED AND TO HAVE GOH
INVITE U.S. OBSERVERS TO HUNGARIAN MANUVERS.

(C) ECONOMIC:

(1) ESTABLISH A U.S. POSITION ON WHAT WE REQUIRE
FROM GOH IN WAY OF MFN ASSURANCES ON EMIGRATION POLICY.

(2) CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE EXCHANGE OF SENIOR
ECONOMIC POLICY OFFICIALS, INCLUDING HAVASI AND BIRO,
BETWEEN U.S. AND GOH.

(3) PROMOTE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN AMERICAN
ECONOMISTS AND OFFICIALS AND THEIR HUNGARIAN COUNTERPARTS.

(4) ENCOURAGE EXPANSION OF AMERICAN-HUNGARIAN
TRADE, BUSINESS CONTACTS, AND JOINT VENTURES, WITH SPECIAL
ATTENTION TO AGRICULTURE AND LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT.

(5) UNDERTAKE ADDITIONAL MARKET-ORIENTED
REPORTING.

(6) ANNUAL PARTICIPATION IN ONE OF BUDAPEST
TRADE FAIRS.

(7) CONCLUDE DOUBLE TAXATION AGREEMENT.

(8) UNTEMPT TO FACILITATE ACTIVITIES OF U.S.
BUSINESSMEN IN HUNGARY BY SEEKING GOH COOPERATION IN
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PROVIDING TRADE DIRECTORIES OF POTENTIAL CONTACTS,
GETTING GOH TO AGREE TO EXPAND NUMBER OF DIRECT CONTACTS
WITH HUNGARIAN FIRMS, AND BY OBTAINING MULTIPLE ENTRY
VISAS FOR BUSINESSMEN.

(D) INFORMATIONAL, CULTURAL, AND SCIENTIFIC:

(1) CONTINUE BUILDING EXCHANGES AND CULTURAL AND
SCIENTIFIC PROGRAM IN ACCORDANCE WITH RECENTLY CONCLUDED
CULTURAL/SCIENTIFIC AGREEMENT AND PROGRAM DOCUMENT.

(2) CONTINUE TO EXPLAIN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TO
MEDIA LEADERS THROUGH REGULAR BRIEFINGS AND DISTRIBUTION
OF BACKGROUND MATERIALS AND POLICY STATEMENTS.

(3) EXPAND PROGRAM OF DISTRIBUTION OF INFORMATION
MATERIALS IN POLITICAL, CULTURAL, ACADEMIC, AND ECONOMIC
FIELDS.

(E) CONSULAR:

(1) CONTINUE PRESENT EFFORT TO RESOLVE DIVIDED
FAMILY CASES BY QUIET DIPLOMACY.

(2) SEEK HUNGARIAN AGREEMENT THAT MULTIPLE ENTRY
VISAS OF ONE-YEAR DURATION BE ISSUED TO OFFICIAL PERSONNEL
OF EACH GOVERNMENT WHOSE DUTIES REQUIRE THEM TO TRAVEL
FREQUENTLY ON TDY TO HOST COUNTRIES.

(3) WHERE FEASIBLE, DEVELOP OTHER PROPOSALS TO
FACILITATE VISA ISSURANCE AND ELIMINATE OR REDUCE VISA
FEES.

(4) WHERE NECESSARY, OBTAIN GOH COOPERATION IN
PROTECTION AND WELFARE SERVICES TO AMERICAN CITIZENS.

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(F) ADMINISTRATIVE:

(1) OBTAIN FBO TEAM IMMEDIATELY TO ADVISE ON
VALUE AND DISPOSAL OF U.S. GOVERNMENT EXCESS PROPERTIES
IN BUDAPEST.

(2) BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS, BY EARLY SEPTEMBER AT
LATEST, FOR INDEMNIFICATION OF UST FOR NATIONALIZED
PROPERTIES, RESOLUTION OF SQUATTER PROBLEM, AND SALE OR
OTHER DISPOSITION OF EXCESS PROPERTY IN BUDAPEST,
OBTAINING IN COMPENSATION BUILDINGS FOR EMBASSY NEEDS.

(3) MAKE VIGOROUS AND PERSISTENT REPRESENTATIONS
TO GOH IN ORDER TO OBTAIN MORE RESPONSIVE TREATMENT FROM
DIPLOMATIC SERVICE DIRECTORATE TO EMBASSY'S ADMINISTRATIVE
NEEDS, ESPECIALLY ACQUISITION OF RENTAL OF LIVING QUARTERS
FOR EMBASSY STAFF.
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